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Abstract—Mobile applications (apps) have become deeply personal, constantly demanding access to privacy-sensitive information in
exchange for more personalized user experiences. Such privacy-invading practices have generated major multidimensional and
unconventional privacy concerns among app users. To address these concerns, the research on mobile app privacy has experienced
rapid growth over the past decade. In general, this line of research is aimed at systematically exposing the privacy practices of apps
and proposing solutions to protect the privacy of mobile app users. In this survey paper, we conduct a systematic mapping study of 54
Software Engineering (SE) primary studies on mobile app privacy. Our objectives are to a) explore trends in SE app privacy research,
b) categorize existing evidence, and c) identify potential directions for future research. Our results show that existing literature can be
divided into four main categories: privacy policy, requirements, user perspective, and leak detection. Furthermore, our survey reveals
an imbalance between these categories— majority of existing research focuses on proposing tools for detecting privacy leaks, with less
studies targeting privacy requirements and policy and even less on user perspective. Finally, our survey exposes several gaps in
existing research and suggests areas for improvement.
Index Terms—Privacy, mobile application, systematic mapping study.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY can be hard to define. The word itself is derivedfrom the Latin Privatus, which means “withdraw from
public life”. However, the majority of modern definitions
can be traced back Brandeis and Warren [1] who defined
privacy in 1890 as “the right to be let alone”. This defini-
tion provided a basis for ensuring the legal protection of
privacy as a fundamental human right. Since then, this
definition has been revisited numerous times to count for
the plethora of political, social, and technological advances
in society. For instance, to meet the growing dimensions of
the concept, Solove [2] expanded the definition of privacy
to include limited access to the self, secrecy, control of
personal information, personhood, and intimacy. Another
notable definition was introduced by Westin [3], who in
1968, described privacy as “the right to select what personal
information about me is known to what people” and later in
2003 as “the claim of an individual to determine what information
about himself or herself should be known to others” [4]. Both
definitions emphasized privacy as a control over personal
information.
The proliferation of mobile devices over the past decade
along with their unique operational characteristics have
imposed new challenges on end-users privacy. In general,
mobile apps are designed with a set of goals in mind. A
goal can be described as any desirable user objective that the
system under consideration should achieve [5]. However,
driven by the fierce market competition, app developers
often deviate from their original goals [6]. These deviations
typically come in the form of extreme privacy-invading
tactics, such as constant location-tracking [7], unsolicited
usage data collection [6, 8], or any form of features that
are engineered to lure users into sacrificing their privacy
in exchange for more personalized services [9, 10].
These intrusive, and sometimes borderline unethical,
practices have led to the emergence of new and more
significant privacy concerns among mobile app users. Such
concerns often revolve around the types of information apps
are asking for, who should or should not have access to
this information, and how to prevent misuse of this access.
In fact, these new challenges have prompted researchers
to broaden existing definitions to include, in addition to
personal information, device-specific information that can
be used as identifiers, including installed apps, connected
WIFI, operating system’s build information, and carrier [10].
In response to these challenges, the research on mobile
app privacy has witnessed rapid growth over the past
decade. In general, studies in this domain cover a broad
range of topics, tackling privacy from a user, system, and
even legal perspectives. To categorize, summarize, and syn-
thesized this body of research, in this paper, we conduct
a survey of existing Software Engineering (SE) literature
related to mobile app privacy. Our survey takes the form of a
Systematic Mapping Study (SMS). SMSs can be considered
a form of Systematic Literature Reviews (SLRs), however,
SMSs tend to be more qualitative in nature, mainly focused
on the classification and thematic analysis of existing litera-
ture in a scientifically rigorous way. SLRs, on the other hand,
are concerned with using statistical meta-analysis methods
to synthesize the outcomes of empirical studies [11, 12].
SMSs have been long used in research as powerful tools
for organizing and categorizing existing evidence and iden-
tifying areas for improvement [13]. A thorough discussion
of the difference between SLRs and SMS is available in
Kitchenham et al. [13] and Petersen et al. [14]. In general,
our objectives in this survey paper include:
∙ Providing descriptive statistics of existing primary
studies on mobile app privacy published in SE
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
03
62
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  8
 O
ct 
20
19
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, VOL. 14, NO. 8, OCTOBER 2019 2
venues between 2010 and 2018.
∙ Systematically categorizing and sub-categorizing
these primary studies based on the research prob-
lems they address.
∙ Summarizing existing evidence under each category
and identifying research gaps and potential areas for
improvement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes our research method, including our research
questions and primary study identification process. Sec-
tion 3 categorizes and summarizes existing primary studies
and identifies directions of future work under each category.
Section 4 discusses the main findings and limitations of our
work. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 METHOD
The survey presented in this paper takes the form of a Sys-
tematic Mapping Study. According to Kitchenham et al. [13],
a mapping study follows the same principled process as sys-
tematic literature reviews [12]. This process consists of three
main steps: planning, conducting, and reporting. Under the
planning phase, the need for the review is justified, the re-
view protocol is established, and the research questions are
defined. During the conducting phase, the review protocol
is put into action, including the identification of primary
studies, categorizing, and synthesizing existing evidence.
Finally, under the reporting phase, the results are reported
in a way that is tailored for the intended audience. In this
section, we describe the main steps of our survey in detail.
2.1 Research questions
It is essential to identify a set of research questions before
taking on a review study. Research questions are necessary
to set the scope of the primary studies that should be consid-
ered in the search process and outline the objectives of the
review. In this survey, our research questions are:
∙ RQ1: How much evidence is available in Software
Engineering research about mobile app privacy? Un-
der this research question, we seek to determine the
number of papers published on mobile app privacy
in Software Engineering research. Our objective is to
systematically assess the community’s effort on this
problem. Research venues tackling mobile privacy
from other perspectives such Machine Learning or
Computer Human Interaction, are excluded.
∙ RQ1: What are the main categories of existing
research? Under this question, we seek to build a
classification scheme of existing primary studies [14].
Our objective is to narrow down the subjects of
mobile app privacy research to few well-defined ar-
eas. Such categorization can provide researchers and
practitioners with a much needed reference structure,
or visual map, that can be easily navigated to get a
quick overview of the frequency of publications and
their main trends over the past decade.
∙ RQ3: What are the limitations of the current re-
search? Under this question, we seek to identify areas
for improvement in existing SE mobile app privacy
research. Specifically, through our categorization, we
seek to identify areas where the research has not
progressed in comparison to other areas. Further-
more, we analyze the future work sections of exiting
papers to outline the authors’ visions of future work
directions in their areas of research. Our objective
is to help junior researchers, or researchers breaking
into the field, to identify the areas which are lacking
evidence, or the views of experts on research direc-
tions that need more attention or worth pursuing.
2.2 Search Process: Identifying primary studies
Our scope includes Software Engineering primary studies
(papers that are not surveys, or secondary studies) tackling
privacy of mobile apps, published in the period from 2010 to
2018. To identify these papers, we followed a three-step pro-
cess. At the first step, we searched four scientific databases:
Google Scholar, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and
arXiv. Our search query can be described as follows:
(Mobile AND (app OR apps) AND privacy) OR (mobile AND
application AND privacy) OR (mobile AND app AND privacy
AND permission) OR (mobile AND app AND privacy AND
(policy OR policies)) OR (privacy AND app store)
The number of papers identified at the first step was 524.
However, since we are only considering software engineer-
ing research, we only considered papers published in SE
venues. Limiting the search to SE venues was necessary for
two main reasons. First, privacy is a very broad concept, as
of June 2019, a trivial search for mobile privacy on Google
Scholar returns 3,810,000 hits. Therefore, it is important to
narrow down the scope of search in order to get a reasonable
number of primary studies. Second, our target audience is
the SE community, or researchers and practitioners who typ-
ically publish in SE venues. To identify our venues, we relied
on previous SMS and SLR studies in the literature [15].
In general, any venue with “Software Engineering” in its
name, or any venue (workshop) that was held with a major
SE venue were included in our analysis. Furthermore, we
enforced the time scope of 2010 - 2018 on selected papers.
2010 was the year where initial work on mobile app privacy
started emerging as a new line of research in SE, following
the lunch of the first app store in 2008. A search for primary
studies before 2010 did not return any hits. In summary, 85
papers were found in SE venues between 2010 and 2018.
These venues, along with the number of papers found in
each, are shown in Table. 1, the number of papers identified
based on each of our sub-queries are shown in Table. 2.
2.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
In SMSs and SRLs, the inclusion and exclusion criteria are
used as a basis for selecting primary studies. Such crite-
ria should be determined beforehand during the planning
phase. Our inclusion criteria in this paper are:
∙ Books, papers, technical reports, and grey literature.
∙ The study explicitly addresses privacy aspects of
mobile apps.
∙ The study is published in English.
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TABLE 1: Selected journals and conference proceedings.
Source Acronym Count Included
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology TOSEM 1 1
Communications of the ACM CACM 1 0
Empirical Software Engineering EMSE 3 2
IEEE Software IEEE SW 1 1
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering TSE 5 5
Information and Software Technology IST 2 1
International Conference Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering FASE 1 1
Inter. Conference on Automated Software Engineering ASE 5 6
Inter. Conference on Mobile Software Engineering and Systems MOBILESoft 15 6
Inter. Conference on Software Engineering ICSE 14 11
Inter. Conference on Software Engineering Companion ICSE Comp. 2 0
Inter. Conference Software Analysis, Evolution, and Reengineering SANER 4 2
Inter. Journal of Secure Software Engineering IJSSE 1 0
Inter. Requirements Engineering Conference RE 6 5
Inter. Symposium on Dependable Software Engineering: Theories, Tools, and Applications SETTA 1 1
Inter. Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering ISSRE 5 3
Inter. Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis ISSTA 5 4
Inter. Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering FSE 4 1
Inter. Working Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality REFSQ 1 0
Inter. Workshop on Automation of Software Test AST 1 1
Inter. Workshop on Requirements Engineering and Law RELAW 1 1
Journal of Systems and Software JSS 3 0
Software: Practice and Experience SPE 3 2
Workshop on Requirements Engineering WRE 0 0
Sum 85 54
1
TABLE 1: The.
TABLE 2: The number of primary studies identified using
each search query in the different repositories considered in
our survey.
Search Query Scholar IEEE ACM arXiv
mobile & app & privacy 11 9 4 0
mobile & application & privacy 3 6 2 0
mobile & app & privacy & policy 0 3 1 0
app & privacy & permission 0 4 1 0
app & store & privacy 3 2 0 0
snowballing 5 0 0 0
We used the following exclusion criteria to exclude any
studies that were irrelevant to our survey goals:
∙ Short papers (less than 4 pages), editorials, and sum-
maries of keynote, or tutorial papers.
∙ Secondary studies (i.e., existing SLRs or SMSs).
∙ Duplicate reports of the same study. In case of dupli-
cation, the most recent version is selected.
To include and exclude papers, each paper was exam-
ined by each of the three authors individually. Specifically,
each author read the title, abstract, and body of each of
our 85 papers to determine its relevance to our survey.
Each judge flagged each paper as Include, Neutral, and
Exclude. The paper was then included or excluded based
on the protocol shown in Table 2. In total, 36 papers out of
our 85 papers were excluded from the analysis.
To reduce the risk of omitting relevant studies, we
also performed a lightweight backward-snowballing on the
included papers [16]. We basically inspected the studies
cited by each of our included primary studies and the
publications that subsequently cited the study, using Google
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Fig. 1: The number of published papers per year from 2010
to 2018.
Scholar. In total, 6 more papers were identified, raising the
number of primary studies to be included in our survey
to 54 papers. The histogram in Fig. 1 shows the number
of identified studies per year from 2010 to 2018. In this
histogram, studies found using snowballing were counted
as Google Scholar papers. A summary of our search process
is shown in the schematic diagram in Fig. 2 and the distribu-
tion of final set of included papers over venue type is shown
in Fig. 3. A detailed description of our search process can be
found in (http://seel.cse.lsu.edu/data/TSE2019.xlsx)
3 PRIMARY STUDY CATEGORIZATION
To develop our classification scheme (RQ2), we follow the
protocol proposed by Petersen et al. [14]. In general, this
protocol can be described as follows:
∙ The reviewers read the abstracts and look for key-
words and concepts that reflect the contribution of
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Fig. 3: The distribution of primary study over venue type.
the paper. If the abstract is poorly structured, the
body of the paper is examined.
∙ A set of keywords representative of the context, or
contribution of the paper, are extracted.
∙ The paper is assigned to an existing category based
on its keywords. If the category does not exist, a new
category is created.
In general, we identified four different categories: pri-
vacy policy, privacy requirements, mobile app users’ per-
spective of privacy, and privacy leak analysis. The last
category was further classified into two main categories of
static and mixed static-dynamic methods. In what follows,
we summarize the papers under each category and we
highlight any areas for improvement.
3.1 Privacy Policy
Mobile apps’ privacy policies act as contracts between app
users and providers. In general, policies inform users about
how their personal information is collected, used, shared,
and protected by the app [8, 17]. Problems in this domain
arise from inconsistencies between privacy claims in the
policy and the actual behavior of the app. These inconsis-
tencies (also known as violations) often take the form of
omission errors, where the policy fails to notify the user
about a specific information-privacy practice [8, 18]. In what
follows, we summarize the papers classified under this
category.
TABLE 2: The decision making process. IN: Include, EX:
Exclude, and NU: Neutral.
Researcher1 Researcher2 Researcher3 Final Decision
IN IN IN/EX/NU Include
EX EX IN/EX/NU Exclude
NU NU IN/EX/NU Consensus Meeting
IN EX NU Consensus Meeting
3.1.1 Existing Work
Yu et al. [19, 20] introduced TAPVerifier, an automated
approach for establishing semantic correlations between
apps’ privacy policies and their bytecode. The authors’
goal was to identify apps’ description-to-behavior fidelity,
or whether the app behaves as advertised. TAPVerifier
relied on text analysis to automatically establish and match
the semantic meaning of the app’s privacy policy, its byte-
code, app store description, and permissions. Evaluating
TAPVerifier on a dataset of 1,200 apps revealed that
privacy policies were more likely to describe privacy-related
behaviors than descriptions. The results also showed that
the proposed approach was able to remove up to 59.4%
of false alerts generated by tools such as Whyper and
AutoCog.
Slavin et al. [21] proposed a semi-automated framework
to help app developers detect inconsistencies between their
privacy policies and code. The proposed framework linked
policy phrases to Application Program Interface (API) meth-
ods that produced sensitive information. Information flow
analysis was then used to detect misalignments by identi-
fying methods that sent data to third-party remote servers.
The proposed framework was empirically evaluated on 477
Android apps and discovered 341 potential privacy policy
violations.
Aydin et al. [6] introduced VisiDroid, a visual config-
uration interface for end users to understand and configure
the way their private information was utilized. The objective
was to tailor privacy policies according to the preferences
and sensitivities of the user. The authors targeted privacy
threats emerging from contextual advertising. Specifically,
through a special GUI, end users were able to configure
constraints on the context. These configurations were then
enforced by the app by anonymizing private fields before
being sent to remote servers. The usability of VisiDroid
was evaluated using a user study of 20 participants. All par-
ticipants were able to finish all their privacy configuration
tasks successfully.
Wang et al. [8] proposed an approach to automatically
detect app privacy policy violations based on user input.
The proposed approach mapped each Graphical User Inter-
face (GUI) input element of the app to ontology concepts,
which in turn were matched with text from the privacy
policy. Static information flow analysis was then used to
detect inconsistencies between the data collection behavior
of the app and the statements of data-collection in the policy
(i.e. privacy leaks). Evaluating the proposed approach over
120 popular apps, sampled from the finance, health, and
dating domains, that tit was able to detect 39 strong and
weak violations in the studied apps.
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Yu et al. [22] presented PPCkecker, a tool for assess-
ing the trustworthiness of Android apps’ privacy policies.
PPChecker employed natural-language processing (NLP)
techniques, such as syntactic analysis, to analyze privacy
policies, and adopted static program analysis approaches
to inspect if the app’s code collected, retained, or disclosed
personal information. Based on this analysis, the authors
identified five kinds of problems in privacy policies: in-
completeness, incorrectness, impreciseness, inconsistency,
and not being user-friendly. Applying PPCkecker to 2,500
popular apps revealed that 1,850 apps (i.e., 74.0%) had at
least one kind of the identified privacy problems.
3.1.2 Summary and Future Work
Our survey revealed that privacy policy research revolves
around detecting policy violations by mapping privacy
claims in the app’s privacy policy to information flow in the
app’s code. Static code analysis tools such as FlowDroid [23]
are typically used to track information flow in bytecode.
Furthermore, majority of the papers under this category
propose some sort of a working prototype to implement
their findings (e.g., PPCkecker [22] and TAPVerifier [19]
and VisiDroid [6]) and evaluation is mainly carried out
on Andriod apps as it is possible to get their APK files.
Finally, our survey revealed that a large percentage of apps
were either non-compliant with their stated privacy claims,
did not provide a policy, or provided a policy that was
ambiguous or incomprehensible to average users [24].
In general, the line of research under this category is still
at its preliminary stages [21]. Specific directions of future
work include combining more dynamic and static analysis
methods with policy analysis methods [22], developing
techniques to further trace the flow of user information to
the respective organizations or servers [21], and expanding
the scope of privacy threats to areas other than contextual
adverting [6, 8]. In terms of tool support, future policy
analysis tools should be engineered to meet the demands of
their specific userbase (e.g., developers, users, regulators).
Such tools should help app developers and policy authors
to stay aware of any violations in their apps, enable end-
users to determine the trustworthiness of the app [22], and
help regulators, such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), or even app stores, to identify questionable or mali-
cious apps [21].
3.2 Privacy in Mobile App User Feedback
App stores provide a mechanism for app users to express
their opinions about apps in the form of textual reviews
and meta-data (e.g., star ratings). Recent research revealed
that around 40% of app store reviews on popular app stores
contain actionable maintenance requests [25, 26]. Address-
ing these requests was found to have a significant positive
impact on the rating of the app [27, 28]. Under this category,
we summarize papers that identified privacy as a major
concern in user feedback.
3.2.1 Existing Work
Khalid et al. [29] conducted an analytical study of user
reviews to help developers better anticipate and prioritize
possible user complaints. The authors manually examined
and classified thousands of one and two star app reviews,
sampled from 20 iOS apps. The analysis uncovered 12
types of common users complaints. Analyzing the impact
of each compliant type on the apps’ ratings revealed that
reviews complaining about privacy invading business prac-
tices were often associated with the most negative impact
on the app as reflected in the ratings.
Mcllroy et al. [30] conducted a qualitative analysis of
close to 7,000 user reviews sampled from Google Play and
the Apple App Store. The results showed that a substantial
amount (30%) of reviews raised more than one technical
issue. In terms of privacy, the authors found that 17% of re-
views raised some sort of privacy concerns also raised other
types of functional or technical concerns. The concentration
of these concerns seemed to vary among app categories,
where the Shopping category had the highest percentage of
privacy complaints. The authors also reported that privacy
issues were expressed using more varied language than
other technical issues.
Ciurumelea et al. [31] proposed a taxonomy to analyze
reviews and codes of mobile apps for a better release plan-
ning. The authors defined specific categories of user reviews
that were highly relevant for developers during software
maintenance, including compatibility, usage, resources, pric-
ing, and privacy. A machine learning based prototype was
then introduced to classify reviews and recommend source
code files that were likely to be modified to handle issues
raised in the reviews. Evaluating the proposed approach
over 39 Android apps showed that it was able to detect
privacy and protection issues with up to 83% precision and
96% recall.
Scoccia et al. [32] conducted a large-scale empirical study
to investigate end users perception of the new Android’s
run-time permission system. The authors collected over 4.3
million user reviews from 5,572 Google Play apps. A sample
of 3,574 permission-related reviews were analyzed using
machine learning (Naive Bayes and Support Vector Ma-
chines) and NLP techniques. The most common permission-
related complaints were then classified into a taxonomy
of issues. The results showed that 8% of collected apps
had reviews with negative comments about permissions.
These permission-related reviews occurred in almost all app
categories.
3.2.2 Summary and Future Work
Our survey revealed that end-user privacy concerns, while
not as common as other functional issues (reliability and
usability), are widespread among almost all app categories
and can have a significant negative impact on the ratings
of apps [30, 29]. However, our survey exposed a gap in ex-
isting research related to mining end-user privacy concerns.
Specifically, the majority of existing work proposes generic
approaches for mining user feedback for generic mainte-
nance requests (bug reports and feature requests) [33]. These
techniques often struggle when it comes to detecting specific
user issues [26]. This emphasizes the need for data mining
techniques that are specifically tailored for detecting privacy
concerns in user feedback, for instance, building taxonomies
of user-defined privacy concerns across the different cat-
egories of the app store. Extracted information should be
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then used to facilitate a privacy-aware app design and
development process.
3.3 Mobile App Privacy Requirements
Under this category, we summarize SE primary studies
related to mining, specifying, and enforcing privacy require-
ments of mobile apps.
3.3.1 Existing Work
Young [18] proposed an approach to obtain software
requirements from privacy policies. The author used a
grounded theory approach to systematically analyze poli-
cies and extract commitments, privileges, and rights con-
veyed within the policies. Extracted information was classi-
fied into 12 different procedural (the privacy practice) and
legal (the law enforces the practice) categories and then
operationalized into software requirements using prede-
fined requirements templates. The analysis was conducted
using a case study on 17 health-care privacy policies. The
results showed that the proposed approach achieved better
coverage in comparison to legal-based approaches since
polices often describe procedural practices rather than legal
practices.
Tun et al. [34] introduced privacy arguments as a means
of analyzing privacy requirements in general and selective
disclosure requirements in particular. These arguments en-
abled users to express their personal privacy preferences
through an extended argumentation language. User prefer-
ences were then used to represent highly dynamic selective
disclosure requirements, and to relate them to the software
architecture in order to enable system adaptation to runtime
privacy requirements. The practical feasibility of the pro-
posed approach was demonstrated over a mobile app that
was developed by the authors.
Omoronyia et al. [35] proposed an adaptive privacy
framework to support the selective disclosure of personal
information in mobile apps. The framework exploited pri-
vacy awareness requirements (PAR) to identify the runtime
privacy properties that should be satisfy in order to man-
age the changing user privacy concerns. The framework
was evaluated over multiple cases where the failures and
satisfactions of PAR were realized. The results showed that
applications that failed to satisfy PAR were unable to reg-
ulate information flow based on the utility of disclosure,
while applications that satisfied PAR were able regulate the
disclosure of information with changing context.
Thomas et al. [36] proposed a problem analysis frame-
work to extract and refine privacy requirements for mobile
apps from data gathered via empirical end-user studies.
The framework provided analytical tools such as thematic
coding, heuristics, facet questions, and extraction rules to
enable a structured analysis of the various privacy prob-
lems experienced by users. Furthermore, the framework
provided a privacy language to reason about and model
privacy requirements. The operation of the framework was
demonstrated using data collected through a case study
targeting users of the Facebook app. The results showed that
the approach was able to provide systematic aid to software
engineers in deriving privacy requirements that addressed
end-users’ privacy concerns and needs.
Mai et al. [37] proposed a use-case driven method to
support the specification of security and privacy require-
ments of multi-device software ecosystems, including mo-
bile and wearable device applications. Specifically, the au-
thors integrated an existing approach of modeling security
threats, their mitigation, and their relations to use cases
in a misuse case diagram. The authors further introduced
templates for specifying mitigation schemes and misuse
case specifications. A regular expression engine was then
used to automatically report inconsistencies among artifacts
and between the templates and specifications. The proposed
approach was applied over industrial multi-device health-
care project and was further evaluated using structured
interviews with four software engineers. The proposed ap-
proach was able to precisely specify and analyze security
threats along with threat scenarios and their mitigations.
Breaux et al. [38, 39] introduced Eddy, a methodology
to map a well-defined subset of privacy requirements from
natural language text to a formal language in description
logic. Eddy was intended to help developers detect con-
flicting privacy requirements within a policy and enable the
tracing of data flows within these policies. A computer sim-
ulation was used to demonstrate the scalability of the pro-
posed language toolset to specifications of reasonable size.
In a more recent work, Breaux et al. [40] targeted the privacy
risks which arise from the increased information sharing
across services (APIs). Specifically, the authors presented
a new Eddy extension to formally model multi-party data
flows requirements. These models were aligned with three
critical privacy principles: purpose specification, collection
limitation, and use limitation. The proposed approach was
evaluated through a case study on the mobile app Waze
and three of its service providers: Facebook, Amazon Web
Services, and Flurry.com. The results showed that the pro-
posed extensions were able to detect conflicts between Waze
and Flurry privacy polices as well as violations of the
principle. In addition, the analysis uncovered two privacy
specification design patterns whereby specification authors
can bypass the limitation principle.
Van Der Sype and Maalej [41] proposed a set of concrete
requirements for app developers to protect users’ privacy,
focusing on the disclosure of users’ personal data to third
parties. These requirements were derived from the EU Data
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) principles for fair
and lawful processing. These principles were categorized
into four groups: purpose limitation, data minimization,
data security, and transparency. The authors further dis-
cussed the tension between law and technology, providing
concrete strategies for developers to ease this tension.
Liu and Simpson [42] introduced PPTMA (Privacy-
Preserving Targeted Mobile Advertising), a solution to
achieve a balance between user privacy and utility in the
context of mobile ads. The authors established the functional
and non-functional requirements, design guidelines, and
architecture of PPTMA based on the unique privacy chal-
lenges of mobile advertising. PPTMA was implemented as
a background service which can be dynamically configured
to enable users to adjust their privacy settings to control
ads’ access to their private information. The prototype was
evaluated on 200 Android apps. The results showed that
PTTMA was able to operate with low memory and power
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consumption, providing effective means for ad-scanning.
3.3.2 Summary and Future Work
Our survey revealed that specifying privacy requirements
for mobile apps can be a very challenging process. These
requirements are highly dynamic and often context specific,
depending on many factors such as time, location, informa-
tion content, domain, and user preferences [36, 34, 35]. This
problem becomes even more challenging in multi-device
ecosystems where the app has to communicate information
with other devices over the network [37].
In terms of future work, our survey exposed several
potential areas of improvement in mobile privacy require-
ments research. These areas are mainly focused on devising
practical techniques for eliciting, modeling, and managing
mobile app privacy requirements. Elicitation techniques
should take into account the constantly changing nature of
privacy requirements under the different usage scenarios of
the apps. This emphasizes the need for new ethnographic
analysis techniques, such as interaction analyses, to obtain
tacit knowledge of users’ behavior in different contexts [36].
These techniques should also consider factors such as exist-
ing privacy regulations and privacy policies when generat-
ing the privacy requirements of the app [41, 18].
Once privacy requirements are specified, modeling tech-
niques should be proposed to represent the relations (syn-
ergies and trade-offs) of these requirements to other entities
in their specific domain, including user goals and functional
features. Existing functional and non-functional require-
ments modeling techniques, such as Feature Oriented Do-
main Analysis (FODA) [43] and Softgoal Interdependency
Graphs (SIGs) [44, 45] can be used to show the manda-
tory, alternative, and optional features of the domain along
with their commonalities and variabilities [46]. Once these
models are generated, they can act as blueprints of privacy-
aware requirements models that app developers in different
application domains can use as references for their design.
Furthermore, such models should be adaptive in order to
reflect the constantly changing privacy concerns and the
newly emerging threats [35]. Finally, the authors of primary
studies emphasize the need for effective automated tool
support and extrinsic evaluation strategies to empirically as-
sess the performance of the proposed techniques in realistic
settings (e.g., validation through experience) [36, 34, 42, 40].
3.4 Privacy Leak Analysis
Under this category, we summarize papers that target pri-
vacy leaks and malicious behavior in mobile apps. In total,
33 primary studies were classified under this category. To
better understand the summaries of these studies, we pro-
vide the following definitions:
∙ Static Analysis: static analysis methods examine
source code or its binary representations without
executing the code. Such methods often employ
control flow graph analysis [7]. FlowDroid [23] and
IccTA [47] are examples of static analysis tools that
are commonly used in privacy leak analysis.
∙ Dynamic Analysis: refers to monitoring the code as
it executes, thus enabling a precise security analysis
based on the run-time behavior of the software. In
general, dynamic methods use data follow methods
to track data from untrusted sources as the program
executes to detect malicious behaviors [48].
∙ Taint Analysis: is a static/dynamic code analysis
method that is commonly used for privacy leak
detection. The goal of the process is to observe
and track tainted/untainted information flow be-
tween sources and sinks. In the context of mobile
apps, a tainted source is any system call that access
private data and a sink is all the possible ways
that make data leave the system (e.g., leak) [49].
TaintDroid [50] is a commonly used tool for taint
analysis in Android apps.
∙ Privacy Leak: a privacy leak could be defined as any
path that sends user’s sensitive information to the
outside world (e.g., a third party server) without the
user’s permission [51].
∙ Permission: In the context of mobile apps, a per-
mission governs the type of user information the
app is allowed to access. This could range from
the data stored in the mobile device’s memory to
any peripherals of the device like the camera or the
motion sensor. Users must grant permissions to the
app before it can access these resources.
Given the large number of papers classified under this
category, we combine related papers summaries into two
subcategories of purely static, and mixed static/dynamic
method analysis.
3.4.1 Static Analysis Methods
Feng et al. [52] presented Apposcopy, a semantic-based
method to detect apps that leak private user information.
Apposcopy used a high-level language to describe the
semantic signatures of malware families and static anal-
ysis to determine whether an app matches a malware
signature. Signature matching was enabled through static
taint analysis and a novel code representation called Inter-
Component Call Graph. These graphs tracked information
flow using pointer analysis. Apposcopy was evaluated on
1027 malicious and 11,215 benign Android apps. The results
showed that it detected malware with high accuracy (90%)
and that its signatures were resilient to various program
obfuscations.
Huang et al. [53] introduced AsDroid, a technique for
detecting stealthy malicious behaviors in Android apps. The
technique consisted of two parts: a static analysis module
for extracting API invocations, and a UI analysis module
for extracting the displayed in the interface. Any mismatch
between the two components’ outputs was considered as
a potential stealthy behavior. A dataset of 182 potentially
problematic Android apps was used to evaluate AsDroid.
AsDroid was able to report stealthy behaviors in 113 apps,
with 28 false positives and 11 false negatives.
Bartel et al. [54] demonstrated that off-the-shelf static
analysis was insufficient for extracting mappings between
API methods and permissions in Android apps. To over-
come these limitations, the authors proposed a set of static
analysis techniques. Three of these techniques were based
on class hierarchy, including string analysis, service iden-
tity inversion, and entry point. Two other techniques: ser-
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vice redirection and service initialization, leveraged a field-
sensitive module, called Spark. Evaluation of the proposed
methods over 1,421 Android apps revealed that 9% of the
apps were accessed more permissions than necessary.
Shen et al. [55] and Holavanalli et al.[56] proposed Flow
Permissions, a technique to enrich the Android permission
mechanism with flow analysis. Flow Permissions was im-
plemented through BlueSeal, a tool that employed static
analysis to extract information flow between permission do-
mains within an app or between apps via IPC (Inter Process
Communication) mechanisms. The cross-app permission
analysis compared information flows within new apps to
those of already-installed apps to derive new Flow Permis-
sions. The effectiveness and utility of Flow Permissions was
evaluated using a dataset of 2,992 popular Android apps
and 1,047 malicious Android apps and a survey of 540
participants. The results indicated that Flow Permissions
was practical to deploy, was able to significantly impact
user’s decisions to install an app and provided visibility
into the holistic behavior of mobile apps.
Gorla [57] proposed CHABADA, a technique for identify-
ing inconsistencies between advertised behavior of Android
apps and their implemented behavior. CHABADA performed
topic modeling on app descriptions and then clustered apps
using k-means. Within each cluster, sensitive APIs which
were governed by a user permission were identified. Out-
liers with respect to API usage were detected using One-
Class Support Vectors Machine (SVM). These outliers were
considered potentially malicious activity. CHABADA was ap-
plied on a set of 22,500+ Android apps. The prototype
was able to detect several anomalies and flag 56% of novel
malware.
Xiao et al. [58] proposed a user-aware privacy control
mechanism to track how sensitive data was used inside
mobile apps. The authors employed static analysis to extract
information flows inside apps. The computed information
flows were classified into safe and unsafe flows based on a
tamper analysis that tracks whether private data is obscured
before escaping through output channels. To evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed method, 50 users opinions
were collected, out of which 90% considered the method to
be effective to protect their privacy. The results also showed
that the proposed approach could be used to automatically
provide default privacy settings for apps.
Huang et al. [59] introduced Dflow, a context-sensitive
information flow type system, and DroidInfer, the corre-
sponding type inference analysis for detecting privacy leaks
in Android apps. DroidInfer improved the scalability
of FlowDroid by avoiding points-to-based static analysis.
The proposed approach was a type-based taint analysis
technique which explained information flows using context-
free language. Evaluating DroidInfer on 144 free Android
apps showed that it was able to detect privacy leaks in
Android apps with a false-positive rate of 15.7%.
Yang et al. [60] introduced AppContext, a mechanism
that statically analyzed sensitive behaviors of Android apps.
AppContext extracted the contexts (events and conditions)
that triggered security-sensitive behaviors. The authors ap-
plied SVM to classify an app as malware or benign based on
the extracted contexts of the app. AppContext was evalu-
ated on a dataset of 202 malicious and 633 benign Android
apps. The results showed that AppContext was able to
correctly identify malicious apps with 87.7% precision and
95% recall.
Li et al. [47] presented IccTA, a static taint analysis
tool for detecting inter-component privacy leaks in Android
apps (paths from sources to sinks). IccTA relied on propa-
gating context information among components. Specifically,
IccTA built a control-flow graph of the whole Android
application. This allowed propagating the context between
Android components and yielding a highly precise data-
flow analysis. IccTA adequately modeled the lifecycle and
callback methods to detect ICC (Inter-component commu-
nication) based privacy leaks. Evaluating IccTA revealed
that it outperformed existing tools (e.g., FlowDroid) on two
popular benchmark datasets, DroidBench and ICC-Bench.
Furthermore, it was able to detect 534 ICC leaks in 108
apps from the MalGenome dataset of malware and 2,395
ICC leaks in 337 apps in a set of 15,000 Google Play apps.
Bagheri et al. [61] presented COVERT, a tool for compo-
sitional analysis of Android inter-app vulnerabilities. The
authors utilized static code analysis to automatically model
apps while they were installed, removed, or updated. A
formal analyzer was used to match the extracted model with
a set of vulnerability patterns to detect leakages occurred
due to the interaction of apps comprising a system. COVERT
was examined against privilege escalation, one of the most
prominent inter-app vulnerabilities, using a dataset of 500
Android apps. The results showed that it was able to detect
inter-app vulnerabilities in several bundles of popular apps.
Avdiienko et al. [62] introduced MUDFLOW, a tool for
detecting malicious apps based on their treatment of sen-
sitive data. MUDFLOW was trained on the data flow of
benign apps (the most popular 2,866 Google Play apps).
For every sensitive data source, the sensitive APIs to which
this data flows was determined. This information was then
used to automatically flag apps with suspicious features.
Specifically, an app’s information flow was extracted using
FlowDroid [23]. MUDFLOW tagged an app as malicious if its
data flow from sensitive sources was different from benign
apps data flow. Applying MUDFLOW on a dataset of 25,577
malicious apps and 2,950 benign apps showed that it was
able to correctly identify 86.4% of all malware, and 90.1% of
malware leaking sensitive data.
Lee et al. [63] presented HybriDroid, a static analysis
framework for Android hybrid apps, or apps supporting
multiple mobile platforms. The proposed framework an-
alyzed inter-communications between Android Java and
JavaScript. The authors relied on extensive testing of source
code of apps to understand the semantics of interoperation
mechanisms of Java and JavaScript and built call graphs for
both Java and JavaScript via an on-the-fly pointer analysis.
To demonstrate the types of analysis supported by the
framework, the authors implemented a bug detector that
identified programmer errors due to hybrid semantics, and
a taint analyzer that found information leaks across lan-
guage boundaries. These tools were empirically evaluated
using 88 apps. The results provided an evidence on the
practicality of the tools and their ability to detect previously
uncovered bugs and privacy leaks in Android hybrid apps.
Li et al. [64, 65] proposed DroidRA, an instrumentation-
based approach to tackle reflection in Android apps by
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propagating string constants. The authors applied code in-
strumentation to replace reflection calls with standard Java
calls. DroidRA resolved string values in a context- and flow-
sensitive manner. DroidRA was evaluated on apps from
the Droidbench benchmark and a dataset of real-world
apps. The results showed that the approach was useful
in uncovering dangerous code (e.g., sensitive API calls,
sensitive data leaks), outperforming several state-of-the-art
analyzers.
Meng et al. [66] proposed a semantic model for Android
malware detection and classification. The model represented
elements of malicious behaviors in malware variants as
Deterministic Symbolic Automata with system APIs as
transitions. Based on this model, the authors implemented
an automatic malware analysis framework. The proposed
framework was evaluated on a malware benchmark and
a dataset of 223,170 real-world Android apps. The results
showed that the framework outperformed several state-of-
the-art malware detection approaches and anti-virus tools.
Rahman et al. [67] used 21 static code metrics, com-
monly used for defect prediction (e.g., bad coding practice
and duplication), to assess the security and privacy risks
associated with Android apps. The authors applied four
statistical learners to predict the level of privacy risk: Radial-
Basis SVM (r-SVM), CART (Classification and Regression
Trees), k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), and Random Forests
(RF). Evaluation was carried out over 4,416 Android apps.
The results showed that r-SVM was able to predict privacy
risks level (e.g., high, medium, and low) with 83% precision.
Narayanan et al. [68] introduced MKLDroid, a static
analysis framework for malware detection and malicious
code localization in Android apps. The framework sys-
tematically integrated multiple views (malware detection
approaches such as sensitive APIs, system calls, and control-
flow) of apps using a graph kernel to capture structural
and contextual information from apps’ dependency graphs.
Multiple Kernel Learning (MKL) was then used to find the
weighted combination of views which achieved the best
detection accuracy. MKLDroid was evaluated through large-
scale experiments on multiple datasets. The results showed
that it outperformed multiple baselines in terms of accu-
racy while maintaining comparable efficiency. Furthermore,
MKLDroid was able to identify malice classes with 94%
average recall.
Zhang et al. [69] developed Ripple, a static reflection
analysis that tackled incomplete information environments
of Android apps. Undetermined intents, behavior-unknown
libraries, unmodeled services, and unresolved built-in con-
tainers were considered as incomplete information environ-
ments. Ripple applied type inference to resolve reflective
calls, even if some data flow were missing. Ripple was
validated over 17 Android apps with incomplete data-flows.
The results showed that it was able to discover reflective
targets with a low false positive rate of 21.9%.
Shan et al. [70] proposed an approach to support the
characterization and detection of self-hiding behaviors in
Android apps. The authors grouped these behaviors into
three main categories: hiding an app’s presence, blocking or
removing traces of remote communications, and subverting
the device’s reminders. A suit of static analysis methods
were employed to detect the defined self-hiding behaviors.
Based on the detected behaviors, apps were labeled as
benign or malicious. The proposed approach was evaluated
on a data set of 9,452 Android apps. The results showed
that each malicious app employed 1.5 self-hiding behaviors,
on average. Furthermore, the proposed technique attained
87.19% F-measure in detecting malicious apps.
Dilhara et al. [71] presented ARPDroid, a technique to
repair incompatible use of permissions in Android apps.
ARPDroid performed static control flow analysis to extract
program points where permission usages must be checked.
Based on the results of the analysis, ARPDroid detected
incompatible permission uses. All incompatibilities were
then resolved using bytecode transformation. Evaluation of
ARPDroid over 23 Android apps showed that it achieved
100% detection accuracy and 90% repair success rate.
Garcia et al. [72] introduced RevealDroid, a
lightweight machine-learning-based approach for detecting
malicious Android apps with privacy leaks and identifying
their general families. RevealDroid leveraged API-based
features (e.g., API method invocations), reflective invoca-
tions, and the internal behaviors of apps’ native binaries
(e.g., external calls made by native binaries). The authors
used a linear SVM for malware detection and a CART clas-
sifier for family identification. RevealDroid was evaluated
on a dataset of around 54,000 malicious and benign Android
apps. The results showed 98% accuracy in detecting mal-
ware and 95% in determination of their families.
Canfora et al. [73] proposed LEILA, a tool for Android
malware families detection and localizing malicious classes
into the infected apps. LEILA applied model checking,
using Milner’s Calculus of Communicating Systems, to ana-
lyze and verify the Java Bytecode produced when the app’s
source code was compiled. This gave the tool an advantage
in case the code was not available due to obfuscation.
LEILA was evaluated on a dataset of malware families
released from 2011 to 2016. The results showed accuracy
levels between 97% and 100%. The authors also devised a
set of rules for specifying malicious behaviors of kinds of
malware families.
3.4.2 Mixed Analysis Methods
Xu et al. [74] presented Premlyzer, a hybrid framework
for automatically analyzing the uses of requested permis-
sions in Android apps. The framework used call stack
based analysis to identify where and how a permission is
used in the app by analyzing the API calls that triggered
the permission check. Premlyzer was evaluated using 51
malware/spyware families and over 110,000 Android apps.
The results showed that Permlyzer was able to provide
detailed permission use analysis and discover the character-
istics of the permission uses in benign and malicious apps.
Hay et al. [75] proposed IntentDroid, a comprehen-
sive testing algorithm for Android Inter-Application Com-
munication (IAC) vulnerabilities. IAC enabled the reuse
of functionality across apps via message passing, thus it
could be used by malicious apps to infect benign apps.
The authors started by describing 8 concrete vulnerability
types, along with attack scenarios, that could result from
the unsafe handling of IAC messages. To test an app,
IntentDroid monitored any APIs responsible for security-
relevant functionality and access to IAC data in order to
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recover IAC-relevant app-level behaviors. All the possible
attack scenarios were then implemented to detect malicious
activities. IntentDroid was evaluated over a dataset of 80
Android apps. The result revealed 150 IAC vulnerabilities
with a recall rate of 92%.
Keng [76] proposed a hybrid static/dynamic analysis to
detect user-triggered causes and paths of privacy leaks in
Android apps. The proposed approach used static analysis
to capture activity transitional paths to identify data leak-
age paths. Technically, the author utilized callback control
flow analysis to generate an activity transition graph. This
allowed automated testing to directly traverse apps towards
privacy related activities for verification. The user-triggered
causes of privacy leaks were then displayed to users in the
form of messages. The proposed approach was evaluated
through a 2-week long field user-study with 47 Android
users. The results showed that the generated privacy mes-
sages were effective for users in managing their privacy.
In a more recent work, Keng et al. [77] introduced
MAMBA, a new automated app testing technique that was
used to extract test cases from control-flow graphs to simu-
late privacy-sensitive API calls. MAMBA initially searched for
user events in control-flow graphs of callbacks generated
from static analysis of app bytecode. Based on the extracted
paths, the tool built test cases using user events that may
trigger access to privacy-sensitive data in the apps. MAMBA
then simulated the execution of the app using the generated
test cases to detect any runtime leaks. Evaluation of MAMBA
on 24 apps showed that MAMBA’s graph-aided directed test-
ing was faster than an exhaustive testing approach.
Lee et al. [78] proposed SEALANT, a tool for analyzing
Android inter-app vulnerabilities. SEALANT applied static
code analysis to analyze architectural information of a given
set of apps from their APKs. The tool then used data-flow
analysis and ICC pattern matching to detect vulnerable ICC
where inter-app attacks could be launched. Extracted infor-
mation was then visualized in integrated and compositional
representations. Evaluating SEALANT over multiple datasets
of Android apps showed that it was able to accurately
identify vulnerable ICC paths and successfully aid users’
understanding of inter-app vulnerabilities.
Zhang and Feng [51] proposed AndroidLeaker, a hy-
brid analysis tool for detecting privacy leaks in Android
apps based on taint analysis. AndroidLeaker used static
analysis (data flow analysis on call graphs) to detect privacy
leaks in individual apps and dynamic analysis to prevent
any leaks caused by cooperation of multiple apps. The goal
was to reduce runtime overhead false alarms often asso-
ciated with static and dynamic methods. AndroidLeaker
was tested on 82 examples from DroidBench, a test suite
released with FlowDroid. The results showed lower preci-
sion (82%) but higher recall (69%) than FlowDroid.
Xu et al. [79] introduced SpyAware, a privacy leak-
age detection framework which examined the correlation
between the data flow of privacy leakage and an app’s
execution path. SpyAware used a profiler module to profile
app executions in binder calls and system calls. A feature ex-
tractor module was implemented to extract feature vectors
of suspicious profile. The authors utilized SVM and Naive
Bayes (NB) to train and predict Spyware executions based
on the feature vectors. The proposed framework was eval-
uated over 100 popular Android apps. Experimental results
showed 67.7% accuracy in device ID leakage detection and
78.4% accuracy in location-leakage detection.
Demissie et al. [49] introduced Android Wicked Dele-
gation (AWiDe), a dangerous case of delegation in which
benign apps unintentionally exposed their access to sensi-
tive resources to attackers (i.e., permissions are re-delegated
to a malicious app). The authors formulated this problem
as a problem of inadequate input validation of inter-app
communication in Android. The authors compared static
and dynamic approaches to automatically detect inadequate
message validation. The first approach used static taint
analysis to detect if the values used in privileged actions
depended on potentially malicious data. The second ap-
proach used dynamic analysis with automatically generated
input values to detect when data during execution was used
in privileged actions by malicious apps. The proposed ap-
proach was validated on a dataset of 329 Android apps. The
results showed that around 15 popular apps were affected
by AWiDe vulnerabilities.
Moussa et al. [80] proposed ACCUSE, an approach to help
users to assess the risk of installing an Android app. ACCUSE
assigned an app a risk factor based on the Android clas-
sification of permissions (normal, dangerous, and system).
The authors rescaled the risk factors with the app’s rating
and the number of downloads. ACCUSE visualized the total
risk of installing an app before installation. Evaluation of
ACCUSE on 12,576 Android apps suggested that it outper-
formed several existing malware detection tools.
Zhao et al. [81] proposed a system to assess whether
an app was vulnerable to location inference attacks. Specif-
ically, the authors employed a series of automatic testing
mechanisms including UI match (dynamic testing) and API
analysis (static analysis) to extract the location information
an app provided. These apps were then classified into two
categories based on the type of attacks: with and without
distance limitations. Evaluating the proposed system on
a dataset of 800 android apps revealed that 34.7% of the
passing apps are vulnerable location-leak attacks.
3.4.3 Summary and Future Work
Our survey revealed that majority of work under this cat-
egory of primary studies is focused on introducing new
and more effective methods for privacy leak detection.
These methods often take the form of a working tool or a
prototype that employs static, dynamic, or mixed models of
code analysis to detect components of the apps (e.g., code,
API calls, GUI components) that might lead to information
leakage.
Our survey also revealed that static code analysis meth-
ods are the most common, with fewer number of papers
applying dynamic and mixed dynamic-static methods. In
fact, even methods applying dynamic analysis often apply
some sort of static analysis to complement the approach.
This can be attributed to the fact that static methods are
typically cheaper to execute and can generate more in depth
information about data flow within the app’s code. How-
ever, there seems to be a consensus that dynamic methods
that track the execution traces of apps would give a far more
detailed view of apps’ behavior [57]. Finally, our survey of
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papers under this category revealed three main directions of
future work. These directions can be identified as follows:
∙ Improving accuracy: the majority of papers suggest
improving the proposed methods’ accuracy as a
main direction of future work. Accuracy, in general,
is related to the ability of the proposed method to
capture privacy leakage, or identify malware apps, or
malicious behaviors with decent levels of precision
and recall [52, 60, 63, 79]. Suggestions for improving
accuracy involve incorporate dynamic analysis [58,
62, 61, 68, 69, 71], testing the proposed approach on
larger datasets of apps or different benchmarks [60],
or validating the effectiveness of the results using
human studies [49].
∙ Coverage: another common line of future work aims
to broaden the scope of research to investigate other
types of attack models [81, 75], including inter-app
attacks [78], malware families [73], malicious behav-
iors [68], and anomalies within specific application
domains [62].
∙ Supporting other platforms: evaluation in the ma-
jority of existing papers is carried over datasets of
Android apps. Therefore, supporting other operating
systems, mainly iOS, is identified in several studies
as a main direction of future work [75, 81, 58, 54].
4 DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide more quantitative analysis re-
sults, describe our study limitations, and describe existing
related work.
4.1 Quantitative summary
Our survey revealed that privacy leak analysis, using static
and dynamic code analysis methods, is the largest category
of primary studies. The categories of privacy requirements
and policy are relatively comparable in size. However, they
have significantly less primary studies than the privacy leak
category. The category of user feedback has the smallest
number of primary studies. Table 3 summarizes our cate-
gories and lists the primary studies classified under each
category, and the Bubble chart in Fig 4 shows the growth of
these different categories (number of papers) over time.
A common theme that our survey revealed was that
the majority of primary studies proposed some sort of a
tool or a working prototype to implement their approach
or evaluate their findings. We list these tools along with
their descriptions in Table 4. Another observation is that,
except for few studies on requirements and policy [30, 29],
evaluation in majority of the primary studies was carried
out over datasets of Android apps. This emphasizes the
need for a community-wide effort to prepare benchmark
datasets that support iOS apps.
4.2 Limitations
In terms of limitations, we notice that some of our identified
categories were more well-defined than others. For example,
several of the primary studies under the user feedback
category were not primarily intended to detect privacy
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Fig. 4: A Bubble chart of the growth of the different cate-
gories over time.
concerns, rather they considered privacy as a user concern
that could be extracted from user feedback. Furthermore,
there were some studies that could be classified under
multiple categories. For example, the primary study in [18]
described techniques for extracting privacy requirements
from policy. Therefore, it could be classified under both
categories. However, since the main focus of the study is
deriving privacy requirements, it was summarized under
the requirements category.
Other limitations might stem from our inclusion/exclu-
sion protocol. Specifically, we relied on our own assessment
of the literature in order to include or exclude papers. To
mitigate this threat, we applied a systematic coding proto-
col, which included individual coding of primary studies
and majority voting. We further acknowledge the fact that
the quality of summaries might vary across the different
categories and sometimes within the same category. We
tried to mitigate this threat by imposing a standard struc-
ture on our summaries. Finally, our suggested directions of
future work, while mainly relied on analyzing the future
work sections of our primary studies, were also based on
our own assessment of the literature. This might raise some
subjectivity concerns as experts in these specific fields might
have different views of which specific problems should be
perused, or which problems have more value to the research
community.
4.3 Related surveys
Since our study takes the form of a systematic survey, other
related surveys, or secondary studies, were excluded from
our survey. For instance, we identified two mobile app
privacy surveys that appeared in SE venues, Sadeghi et
al. [82] proposed a taxonomy and qualitative comparison
of program analysis techniques for security assessment of
Android apps, and Li et al. [7] conducted a systematic
literature review of static analysis methods of Android apps.
In general, our mapping study can be distinguished
from these existing surveys along two main dimensions.
First, we considered the problem from a SE perspective by
only considering venues that are commonly known to be
SE focused venues, and second, we extended our survey
beyond code analysis to include a broader range of SE
topics, such as policy, requirements, and user feedback. To
that extent, our mapping study bridges an important gap in
existing secondary literature on mobile apps privacy.
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TABLE 3: Categories and subcategories of primary studies as identified in our survey.
Category Description Studies
Privacy Policy
Studies under this category target inconsistencies between
apps claimed privacy practices, listed in the privacy policy,
and their actual behavior.
[6], [8], [19], [20], [21], [22]
User Feedback Studies under this category are aimed at mining user privacyconcerns from app store reviews. [29], [30], [31], [32]
Privacy Requirements Studies under this category are focused on mining, specify-ing, and enforcing privacy requirements of mobile apps.
[18], [37], [34], [35], [36], [38], [39], [40],
[42], [41]
Privacy Leaks
Static Analysis Studies in this category use static program analysis to detectprivacy leakage in mobile apps.
[47], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58],
[59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66],
[67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73]
Mixed Methods These studies combine static and dynamic methods for de-tecting privacy leaks.
[49], [51], [74], [75], [76], [77], [78], [79],
[80], [81]
TABLE 4: The list of the tools and working prototype proposed in the primary studies summarized in our survey.
Tool Category Brief Description
TAPVerifier [19] Privacy Policy An application verification tool that utilizes privacy policies to detect privacy violations.
VisiDroid [6] Privacy Policy A visual configuration interface that allows users to configure their privacy preferences.
PPCkecker [22] Privacy Policy A tool for assessing the trustworthiness of the Android apps’ privacy policies.
PPTMA [42] Privacy Requirements A service to achieve a balance between user privacy and utility.
Apposcopy [52] Static Analysis A semantic-based static taint analysis method to detect malicious apps.
AsDroid [53] Static Analysis A privacy leak detector that detects inconsistencies between API invocations and UI.
BlueSeal [55, 56] Static Analysis An automatic system to generate Flow Permissions in Android apps.
CHABADA [57] Static Analysis A technique to identify inconsistencies between apps’ descriptions and their behavior.
Dflow + DroidInfer [59] Static Analysis A context-sensitive information flow type system for detecting privacy leaks in Android apps.
AppContext [60] Static Analysis A privacy violation detection technique based on the context information.
IccTA [47] Static Analysis A static taint analyzer for detecting inter-component privacy leaks.
COVERT [61] Static Analysis A compositional analysis tool to detect Android inter-app vulnerabilities.
MUDFLOW [62] Static Analysis A static taint analysis tool for distinguishing malicious apps based on their data flow.
HybriDroid [63] Static Analysis A static analysis framework for hybrid apps.
DroidRA [64, 65] Static Analysis A string inference analysis for resolving reflection.
MKLDroid [68] Static Analysis A context-aware, multi-view malware detection tool using graph kernels.
Ripple [69] Static Analysis a reflection analysis that tackles incomplete information environments of Android apps.
ARPDroid [71] Static Analysis A static control flow technique for detecting incompatible permission uses.
RevealDroid [72] Static Analysis A lightweight machine-learning-based approach for detecting malicious apps.
LEILA [73] Static Analysis A Java bytecode analyzer exploiting model checking to detect malicious activities.
Premlyzer [74] Mixed Methods A hybrid permission analysis tool for Android apps.
IntentDroid [75] Mixed Methods A testing approach to detect Android inter-application communication vulnerabilities.
MAMBA [77] Mixed Methods A graph-aided directed testing system for the automated checking of privacy behaviors.
SEALANT [78] Mixed Methods A tool for automated analysis and visualization of Android inter-app vulnerabilities.
AndroidLeaker [51] Mixed Methods A hybrid analysis tool for detecting privacy leaks in Android apps.
SpyAware [79] Mixed Methods A privacy leakage detection framework based on data flow and execution path analysis.
ACCUSE [80] Mixed Methods An approach to assess apps’ installation risks.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We conducted a systematic mapping study of Software En-
gineering literature on mobile apps privacy. Our objectives
were to categorize and summarize the state-of-the-art and
enumerate the challenges to be addressed by the Software
Engineering research community. Our survey included 54
primary studies published in software engineering venues
in the period between 2010 and 2018. These studies were
classified, following a systematic coding process, into four
main categories: policy, requirements, user feedback, and
privacy leak analysis. Our survey revealed that the largest
percentage of existing literature tackled problems related to
privacy leaks, with less number of papers classified under
the other three categories. Primary studies classified under
each category were further summarized and their future
work sections were analyzed. The analysis exposed several
directions of future work in each of the categories and
suggested several areas for improvement.
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